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NOTES
RULE 10b-5 AND NON-TRADITIONAL INSIDERS:
THE SUPREME COURT CONTINUES ITS
RETRENCHMENT TREND-
CHIARELLA V. UNITED STATES
As a result of the disastrous stock market crash of 1929 and its serious
after effects on the national economy, President Roosevelt and Congress cre-
ated statutory reform measures in an attempt to prevent a reoccurrence.,
Their goal was to impose a system of disclosure that would provide the in-
vesting public with information necessary to conduct transactions on the se-
curities exchanges.' The products of their intense administrative and legisla-
tive work were the Securities Acts of 1933 (1933 Act) and the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934 (1934 Act).'
The 193 Act was directed at the new issue market, mandating disclosure
through registration and reporting requirements in the sale of new issues of
securities.' The 1934 Act was aimed primarily at the trading markets; its
main objective was to protect investors from manipulative and deceptive de-
vices in the purchase and sale of securities.' Such investor protection was to
be accomplished by a series of pervasive sections which would, inter alia,
proscribe practices that undermined investor confidence in the integrity of
the securities markets.
One such provision is section 10(b) of the 1934 Act 6 and the attendant
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) rule 10b-5,7 which sought to
promote investor confidence in the securities market by forbidding devices
that would operate as a fraud on any purchaser or seller of any security.8 In
1. President Roosevelt framed the issue as follows:
The people of this country are, in overwhelming majority, fully aware of the fact
that unregulated speculation in securities and in commodities was one of the most
important contributing factors in the artificial and unwarranted "boon" which had
so much to do with the terrible conditions of the years following 1929.
Letter from President Franklin Roosevelt to Hon. Sam Rayburn (March 26, 1934), reprinted in
5 J. ELLENBERGER & E. MAHAR, LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE SECURITIES AcT OF 1933 AND
THE SECURITIES EXCHANGE AcT OF 1934, Item 18 (1973) [hereinafter cited as ELLENBERCER &
MAHAR]. Representative Rayburn was chairman of the Interstate and Foreign Commerce Com-
mittee which heard testimony and debated the proposed legislation that was to become the
1933 and 1934 Securities Acts.
2. Representative Rayburn instructed that regulation of the stock exchanges and the rela-
tionships of the investing public to issuers of securities was necessary because investor confi-
dence in the securities market had dissolved as a result of the 1929 stock market crash. H.R.
REP. No. 1383, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 1-5 (1934), reprinted in 5 ELLENBERGER & MAHAR, supra
note 1, at Item 18.
3. Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a-77aa (1976); Securities Exchange Act of 1934,
15 U.S.C. §§ 78a-78kk (1976).
4. This Note will not examine the 1933 Act. For citations of sources concerning the 1933
Act, see note 32 infra.
5. See notes 32-39 and accompanying text infra.
6. See note 24 infra.
7. See note 25 infra.
8. See notes 24 & 25 infra. 101
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Chiarella v. United States," the United States Supreme Court again inter-
preted that section and rule in a situation where neither legislative history
nor the statute itself offered specific guidance as to resolution of the issue.
Contrary to the expansive interpretations assigned those provisions by the
federal courts, 0 the Supreme Court held that a financial printer who traded
securities based upon material nonpublic information to which he had access
by virtue of his employment was under no duty to disclose that
information." The Court, therefore, condoned the printer's activities, per-
mitting him to avoid the policies that section 10(b) and rule 10b-5 were
enacted to promote.
This Note analyzes the Chiarella Court's interpretation of section 10(b)
and rule 10b-5, critically examining the Court's treatment of precedent that
should have guided the Court to a result more protective of the investing
public. Further, this Note examines several alternative theories upon which
a more protective policy could have been grounded. It concludes that the
Chiarella decision may have deleterious consequences for the very persons
Congress sought to protect.
THE FACTUAL BACKGROUND
Vincent Chiarella was employed as a mark-up man 12 at Pandick Press, a
New York City financial printing house. As part of its financial printing serv-
ices, Pandick Press printed corporate tender offers.'" To preserve the con-
fidentiality of the tender offers until the acquiring companies desired the
information to be made public, Pandick Press was given copy with the target
companies' names encoded." Immediately before the final printing, cus-
tomers supplied Pandick Press with the actual names, which were then in-
serted into the documents.'5
9. 445 U.S. 222 (1980).
10. See notes 41-66 and accompanying text infra.
11. 445 U.S. at 231.
12. A mark-up man is the first employee at Pandick Press to view customer copy. He is
responsible for defining the size, style, and depth of type and for routing the pages to copy
cutters for distribution to linotype operators. United States v. Chiarella, 588 F.2d 1358, 1363
(2d Cir. 1978).
13. A tender offer is a means by which an acquiring corporation may purchase the outstand-
ing shares of a target company. Such an offer is made to the target company's shareholders for a
fixed time, and at a fixed price generally above the prevailing market price. See H. BI.oos,-
ENTHAL, 1979 SECURITIEs LAw HANDBOoK 135 (1979) [hereinafter cited as BI.OlosIeNTIAsI.]; 2 A.
BiiOMBERc & L. LOWENFELS, SECURITIEs FRAUI) & COMMODIITIEs FRAUD § 6.3(111) (1969)
[hereinafter cited as BROMBER; & LOWENFELSI.
An opportunistic individual who learns of an impending tender offer may buy target con-
pany stock at the market price and then sell it at the artificially higher price resulting from the
announcement of the offer.
14. 588 F.2d at 1363. The code names often contained the same nulnber of letters as tile
true names they replaced. Thus, the code name for "Emhart Corp." became "Arabia Corp."




On five separate occasions between September 1975 and November 1976,
Chiarella decoded the fictitious names 16 despite warning signs posted at Pan-
dick Press which forbade personal use of customer information. 17 On the
basis of the undisclosed information regarding the imminent tender offers,
Chiarella purchased shares of the target companies. He sold the shares im-
mediately after the information was made public and the price had risen. is
As a result of his use of nonpublic information, Chiarella realized profits in
excess of $30,000.1
Subsequently, the SEC initiated an investigation into Chiarella's trading
activities.20  Pursuant to a consent decree 21 entered into with the SEC in
May 1977, Chiarella returned his profits to the sellers of the target com-
panies' stock. 22  On January 4, 1978, Chiarella was indicted on seventeen
criminal counts 2' of willful misuse of material nonpublic information in con-
nection with the purchase and sale of securities in violation of section 10(b)24
16. Chiarella, an experienced and knowledgeable stock trader, spoke with his broker as
often as ten to fifteen times a day. He deduced the names of the target companies by using
other information Pandick Press received in the tender offers, including price histories and par
values. Id.
17. The warning signs read as follows:
TO ALL EMPLOYEES:
The information contained in all typeset and printing done by Pandick Press,
Inc., is the private and personal property of the customer.
You are forbidden to use any information learned from the customer's copy,
proofs or printed jobs for your own or anyone else's benefits, friend or family or
talking about it except to give or receive instructions. Any violation of this rule will
result in your being fired immediately without warning.
In addition, you are liable to [sic] criminal penalties of 5 years in jail and $10,000
fine for each offense.
If you see or hear of anybody violating this, report it immediately to your super-
visor or to Mr. Green or Mr. Fertig. Failure to report violations will result in your
being fired.
Id. at 1369. The warning notices were posted near the time clock that employees used every
day, on the back of their time cards, on various bulletin boards, and in pay envelopes. Further,
Pandick Press distributed warning cards to all employees and required that they be signed and
returned. Brief for Respondent at 6, Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222 (1980).
18. See note 13 and accompanying text supra.
19. 588 F.2d at 1363.
20. The 1934 Act empowers the SEC to investigate possible violations of the securities laws.
15 U.S.C. § 78u(a) (Supp. 1980).
21. A consent decree is an agreed order in which the defendant neither admits nor denies
the substantive allegations at issue. See BRoNMBERG & LOWENFELS, supra note 13, § 1.3(3.20).
22. On the same day, he was discharged by Pandick Press. 588 F.2d at 1364.
23. Section 32(a) of the 1934 Act authorizes criminal prosecutions for willful violations of the
1934 Act or any rule or regulation thereunder. 15 U.S.C. § 78ff(a) (Supp. 1980).
24. Section 10(b) of the 1934 Act provides in pertinent part:
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of any means
or instrumentality of interstate commerce or of the mails, or of any facility of any
national securities exchange
(b) To use or employ, in connection with the purchase or sale of any security reg-
istered on a national securities exchange or any security not so registered, any man-
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and rule 10b-5.1 Although Chiarella moved for dismissal of the indictment
claiming that it failed to charge a crime, he was eventually found guilty on
every count.2 6
On appeal to the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, Chiarella's
conviction was affirmed. 7 The court held, inter alia, 28 that the indictment
charged a crime, and that Chiarella's conduct violated his duty as a "market
insider" and therefore was in contravention of rule 10b-5."5 The United
ipulative or deceptive device or contrivance in contravention of such rules and reg-
ulations as the Commission may prescribe as necessary or appropriate in the public
interest or for the protection of investors.
15 U.S.C. § 780) (1976).
25. SEC rule 10b-5 provides:
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of any means
or instrumentality of interstate commerce, or of the mails or of any facility of any
national securities exchange,
(a) To employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud,
(b) To make any untrue statement of a material fact or to omit to state a material
fact necessary in order to make the statements made, in the light of the circum-
stances under which they were made, not misleading, or
(c) To engage in any act, practice, or course of business which operates or would
operate as fraud or deceit upon any person, in connection with the purchase or sale
of any security.
17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1980). Promulgation of rule 10b-5 has been upheld as valid. See Fisch-
man v. Raytheon Mfg. Co., 188 F.2d 783, 786 (2d Cir. 1951) (dictum); United States v. Shind-
ler, 173 F. Supp. 393, 394-95 (S.D.N.Y. 1959) (the rule is a valid exercise of SEC's quasi-
legislative function within scope of section 10(b)). It has also passed constitutional challenges on
the grounds of vagueness and improper delegation of authority. See Speed v. Transamerica
Corp., 99 F. Supp. 808, 831 (D. Del.) (under § 10(b), SEC authorized to adopt antifraud
provisions of rule), reaff'd on later motions, 100 F. Supp. 461 (D. Del. 1951), modified on
other grounds, 235 F.2d 369 (3d Cir. 1956).
26. United States v. Chiarella, 450 F. Supp. 95 (S.D.N.Y. 1978). Chiarella received thirteen
concurrent one-year terms, which were suspended after one month's imprisonment. The sen-
tence was suspended on the remaining counts, and he was placed on probation for five years
following his release from prison. 588 F.2d at 1364.
27. 588 F.2d at 1373.
28. The Second Circuit also held that Chiarella had fair notice of potential criminal liability
for his conduct. He had contended that to interpret rule 10b-5 as requiring an affirmative duty
to disclose to persons other than insiders or "tippees" (those persons receiving tips from insid-
ers) would be an unwarranted extension of the rule and therefore would violate the fair notice
element of due process. The court, citing United States v. Persky, 520 F.2d 283, 288 (2d Cir.
1975), noted that due process requires only that "a clear and definite statement of the conduct
proscribed" exist before the allegedly criminal action is taken. 588 F.2d at 1369.
Additionally, the Court of Appeals ruled that the government need not prove specific intent
to defraud in order to reach a conviction under rule 10b-5. Id. at 1370. For this proposition the
court cited Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185 (1976), which determined that the
requisite scienter must be something more than negligence but not as great as specific intent.
Id. at 197, 201.
29. 588 F.2d at 1368 For a discussion of market insiders, see note 121 and accompanying
text infra.
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States Supreme Court granted certiorari ' and reversed the lower courts,
holding that Chiarella's conduct did not violate section 10(b). The Court
stated that liability is premised upon a duty to disclose nonpublic informa-
tion and that Chiarella was not subject to such a duty."
HISTORY OF SECTION 10(b) AND RULE 10b-5
The overall goal of the federal securities law is to prevent fraud. A com-
prehensive and detailed scheme of registration and reporting requirements
additionally aims at ensuring a regulated securities marketplace." Section
10(b) of the 1934 Act and rule 10b-5 promulgated thereunder- form the
heart of the antifraud provisions.' Scarce evidence of congressional intent
regarding section 10(b)" stands in contrast to the numerous judicial inter-
pretations concerning the scope of this section.' Similarly, rule 10b-5 was
created with little fanfare and was accompanied by little explanation. 7  Its
30. United States v. Chiarella, 441 U.S. 942 (1979).
31. 445 U.S. at 227-28.
32. See BROMBEH & LOWENFELS, supra note 13, §§ 2.2(100)-(340); Brudney, Insiders, Out-
siders and Informational Advantages Under the Federal Securities Laws, 93 HABS. L. REV. 322,
324-26 (1979) [hereinafter cited as Brudney. This Note considers only the issue of securities
fraud. For useful descriptions of the registration and reporting requirements, see Brudney,
supra, at 324-26; 5 A. JACOBS, TnE IMPACT OF RULE lob-5 § 3.01[a] (1980) [hereinafter cited as
JACOBS]; 2 L. Loss, SECURITY RECULATIONS 1288 (1961); Gruenbaum, Corporate/Securities
Lawyers: Disclosure, Responsibility, Liability to Investors, and National Student Marketing
Corp., 54 NOTRE DAME LAw. 795 (1979); Loss, The Federal Securities Code, 33 U. MlA\ r L.
REV. 1431 (1979).
33. The SEC is empowered to create rules and regulations for enforcement and interpreta-
tion of the 1934 Act. 15 U.S.C. § 78w(a) (Supp. 1980).
34. For discussions of other securities law antifraud provisions, see BLOOMENTHAL, supra
note 13, at 68: JAcoBs, supra note 32, §§ 3.01[c], [d]; Brudney, supra note 32, at 324.
35. Professor Bromberg noted that of the nearly one thousand pages of testimony in the
House of Representatives surrounding the creation of the 1934 Act, the references to § 10(b)
"would scarcely fill a page." BEOMlBERC & LOWENFELS, supra note 13, § 32.2(331).
36. See, e.g., Affiliated Ute Citizens v. United States, 406 U.S. 128, 151 (1971) (repeated
use of "any" in statute and rule show that their proscriptions are to be broadly interpreted);
SEC v. Ralston Purina Co., 346 U.S. 119, 124 (1953) (design of statute is to protect investors);
Crane Co. v. Westinghouse Air Brake Co., 419 F.2d 787, 793 (1969) (statutory objective of 1934
Act is to prevent inequitable and unfair practices in securities market); SEC v. Texas Gulf
Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833, 858 (2d Cir. 1968) (purpose of act to "promote free and open public
securities markets" and to "secure fair dealing in the securities markets"), cert. denied, 404
U.S. 1005 (1971).
37. Milton V. Freeman, an attorney with the SEC, gave this account of the creation of rule
10b-5:
It was one day in the year 1943, I believe. I was sitting in my office in the SEC
building in Philadelphia and I received a call from Jim Treanor who was then the
Director of the Trading and Exchange Division. He said, "I have just been on the
telephone with Paul Rowen," who was then the SEC Regional Administrator in
Boston, "and he has told me about the president of some company in Boston who is
going around buying up the stock of his company from his own shareholders at
$4.00 a share, and he has been telling them that the company is doing very badly,
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purpose was simply stated as prohibiting individuals or companies from
buying securities if such purchase involved fraud." Due to the lack of ex-
plicit direction from the SEC and Congress, the courts have fashioned their
own interpretations of the meanings of section 10(b) and rule 10b-5.3'
The earliest interpretations of section 10(b) suggested that Congress had
not intended to create a private right of action based on a violation, but had
merely meant to give the SEC power to deal with fraudulent purchases."'
Several years after implementing rule 10b-5, however, the SEC, in Karden
v. National Gypsum Co.,4 argued that an implied private right of action
existed under the rule, and the Karden court agreed.2 Recognition of a
private right of action afforded the SEC the aid of private investors in polic-
whereas, in fact, the earnings are going to be quadrupled and will be $2.00 a share
for this coming year. Is there anything we can do about it?" So he came upstairs
and I called in my secretary and I looked at Section 10(b) and I looked at Section 17
[dealing with fraud or deception in the offer or sale of securities], and I put them
together, and the only discussion we had there was where "in connection with the
purchase or sale" should be, and we decide it should be at the end.
We called the Commission and we got on the calendar, and I don't remember
whether we got there that morning or after lunch. We passed a piece of paper
around to all the commissioners. All the commissioners read the rule and they
tossed it on the table, indicating approval. Nobody said anything except Sumner
Pike who said, "Well," he said, "we are against fraud, aren't we?" That is how it
happened.
American Bar Association, Section of Corporation, Banking and Business Law, Conference on
Codification of the Federal Securities Law, 22 Bus. LAW. 793, 922 (1967).
38. Securities Exchange Act Release No. 3230 (May 21, 1942). Had the Administrative Pro-
cedure Act been in effect when rule 10b-5 was created, the administrative history of the rule
would have been more explicit. Administrative Procedure Act, § 4(b), 5 U.S.C. § 553(c) (1977)
(agencies must provide a clear and concise statement of the basis and purpose of the rules they
promulgate).
39. Compare SEC v. Ralston Purina Co., 346 U.S. 119, 125 (1953) (design of statute is to
protect investors) and Shapiro v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 495 F.2d 228,
236-40 (2d Cir. 1974) (equal access to information prevents inequitable and unfair practices and
ensures fairness) with Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185 (1976) ("Neither the intended
scope of § 10(b) nor the reasons for the changes in its operative language are revealed explicitly
in the legislative history of the 1934 Act"). Hochfelder is an early case in the Court's retrench-
ment of the scope of § 10(b) liability. See notes 67-76 and accompanying text infra.
40. See, e.g., Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 729-30 (1974) (no
indication that private civil remedies exist for violation of § 10(b)); BROMBERC & LOWENFELS,
supra note 13, § 2.2(420).
41. 69 F. Supp. 514 (E.D. Pa. 1946).
42. The Karden court noted that § 10(b) and rule X-10B-5 (as rule 10b-5 was known before a
general renumbering in 1956 and 1957) did not explicitly provide a civil remedy for individuals
injured by a violation of the section or rule. 69 F. Supp. at 513. The court cited a section of the
Restatement of Torts, however, providing that a violation of a legislative enactment creates
liability if an actor invades the interests of one whom the statute was intended to protect. See
RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 286 (1934). The court broadly stated that "the disregard of the com-
mand of a statute is a wrongful act and a tort." 69 F. Supp. at 513. The Supreme Court later
recognized the existence of a private right of action in Superintendent of Ins. v. Bankers Life &
Cas. Co., 404 U.S. 6, 13 n.9 (1971).
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ing the securities marketplace;43 indeed, there has been a proliferation of
rule 10b-5 cases."
Although courts have encountered few problems in applying section 10(b)
and rule 10b-5 to traditional corporate insiders,"5 extending liability beyond
the usual boundaries has met with more resistance.46  The extended liability
refers to non-traditional insiders, those individuals who by virtue of their
position outside the corporate structure are able to affect the securities
marketplace.
The SEC addressed the question of non-traditional insiders in the land-
mark case In re Cady, Roberts & Co." which involved a broker-dealer who
sold certain securities after receiving nonpublic information from a co-worker
who also served as a director of the company to which the information
pertained." Determining that the broker-dealer was guilty of unfair trading,
the SEC developed an "access and fairness" test.5" Under the Cady,
Roberts test, a violation occurs when information is obtained by means of a
relationship giving access to material intended only for a corporate
purpose."s The inherent unfairness arises when the individual is aware that
43. The recognition of a private right of action has aided the SEC's enforcement of rule
1Ob-5 violations by greatly enlarging the class of potential plaintiffs. See, e.g., Sargent v. Gen-
esco, Inc., 492 F.2d 750, 760 (5th Cir. 1974) (successful implementation of rule 10b-5 is depen-
dent upon private enforcement). See also BROMBERG & LOWENFELS, supra note 13, § 2.2(451).
44. Professor Bromberg estimates that rule 10b-5 cases now represent nearly one-third of all
cases brought under the securities statutes. BROMBERG & LOWENFELS, supra note 13, § 2.5(b).
Several factors enhance the desirability of using 10b-5 to bring a cause of action. First, state
statutes of limitations, which govern implied 10b-5 actions, are often lengthier than their federal
counterparts. Second, the requirement of privity between plaintiffs and defendants is less rigid
under an implied right of action. Finally, the burden of proof is less stringent under 10b-5 than
under express liability provisions for market manipulation or inaccurate reports filed with the
SEC. Id. §§ 2.5(1), (3), (4).
45. See JAcoBs, supra note 32, § 66.02[a].
46. The statements of two commentators illustrate the differing viewpoints. While Bromberg
asserts that rule 10b-5 violations are not limited to corporate directors, officers, or major share-
holders, BROMBERG & LOWENFELS, supra note 13, § 7.4 (6)(b), Jacobs claims that trading re-
strictions are imposed only on insiders and tippees, JAcoBs, supra note 32, § 66.02[a].
47. Examples of cases finding non-traditional insiders liable under rule 10b-5 include: Affili-
ated Ute Citizens v. United States, 406 U.S. 128 (1972) (market makers); Zweig v. Hearst
Corp., 594 F.2d 1261 (9th Cir. 1979) (writer of newspaper article recommending purchase of a
corporation's stock); Crane Co. v. Westinghouse Air Brake Co., 419 F.2d 787, 796 (2d Cir.
1969) (merger and acquisition partners), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 822 (1970); Myzel v. Fields, 386
F.2d 718, 739 (8th Cir. 1967) (agents for an insider), cert. denied, 390 U.S. 951 (1968); and Ross
v. Licht, 263 F. Supp. 395, 409-10 (S.D.N.Y. 1967) (business associates, employees of issuer
and family members). See also Glickman, "Tippee" Liability Under Section 10(b) and Rule
10b-5 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 20 KAN. L. REV. 47, 52 (1971); Jennings, Insider
Trading in Corporate Securities: A Survey of Hazards and Disclosure Obligations Under Rule
10b-5, 62 Nw. U.L. REV. 809, 827 (1968); Poole, Corporate 'Insiders' Face More Regulation, 48
MICH. ST. B.J. 28, 39 (1963).
48. 40 S.E.C. 907 (1961).
49. The information related to a decision by the company's directors to cut dividends below
those paid in its first three financial quarters. Id. at 909.
50, Id. at 911-12.
51. Id. at 912.
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the information is unavailable to those with whom he or she is dealing. 2 In
Cady, Roberts, the unfairness arose when the broker-dealer sold shares of
the company's stock on his own behalf without disclosing the nonpublic in-
formation in his possession."
The Cady, Roberts rationale was affirmed in SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur
Co.,, in which certain company employees bought Texas Gulf Sulphur stock
for their own use based upon material nonpublic information. The informa-
tion related to extraordinarily rich mineral deposits at several of the com-
pany's exploration sites.5" The Second Circuit held that anyone in posses-
sion of material inside information must disclose it; or, alternatively, if that
person is precluded from revealing it in order to protect a corporate confi-
dence, he or she must refrain from trading or recommending the securities
in question.' Citing the Cady, Roberts access and unfairness test as articu-
lating the "essence of the rule,"s" the Texas Gulf Sulphur court reasoned
that the policy behind rule 10b-5 is the expectation that investors trading on
the impersonal securities exchanges have relatively equal access to material
information."s Significantly, while the Cady, Roberts test specifically re-
quired a "relationship" giving access to nonpublic information, the Texas
Gulf Sulphur court apparently found such a relationship unnecessary. The
court ruled that access alone to corporate information prevents an individual
from using that information for the personal benefit of anyone.59
The trend towards extended liability of non-traditional insiders for non-
disclosure next branched to "tippees.' °  During the mid-1970s, the Su-
52. Id.
53. Id. at 908.
54. 401 F.2d 833, 848 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 1005 (1971).
55. 401 F.2d at 843-46. In November 1963, when drilling at the site began, Texas Gulf
Sulphur stock was selling between 173/ and 207/8. In early April 1964, the defendants made
their stock purchases. By the middle of the month, the company publicized the news of a major
mineral discovery, and its stock rose quickly to a high of 32. By May 15, 1964, company stock
was selling at 581/4. Id. at 847.
56. Id. at 878.
57. Id.
58. Id. The court noted that such an expectation exists whether based on traditional fiduci-
ary concepts, see Hotchkiss v. Fisher, 136 Kan. 530, 16 P.2d 531 (1932), or on the "special
facts" doctrine, see Strong v. Repide, 213 U.S. 419 (1909). The special facts doctrine, in corpo-
rate applications, instructs that when special circumstances make it inequitable for an insider to
withhold information from the shareholders, a duty to disclose arises. Concealment constitutes
fraud. Taylor v. Wright, 69 Cal. App. 2d 371, 159 P.2d 980 (1945).
The dissent in Chiarella made broad use of the special facts doctrine, citing Strong to argue
that the petitioner's conduct fell within its scope. 445 U.S. at 232. The majority, however,
rejected the use of Strong because liability there was based on a pre-existing duty between the
corporate insider in question and the shareholders. Id. at 225 n.10.
59. 401 F.2d at 848. The court stated that the rule is applicable to those individuals who are
not traditional insiders. Id. at 848-49.
60. See note 84 infra. See Ross v. Licht, 263 F. Supp. 394, 410 (S.D.N.Y. 1967) (the court
stated that certain defendants were not insiders; rather they were tippees and subject to the
same duty to disclose nonpublic information or refrain from trading corporate stock as are insid-
ers). In Shapiro v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 495 F.2d 228 (2d Cir. 1974),
the court found it "untenable ... [that] a distinction should be drawn between . . . 'tippers'
and 'tippees.' " Id. at 237.
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preme Court joined the lower federal courts in giving liberal readings to
section 10(b) and rule lOb-5. " Representative of this line of cases is Affili-
ated Ute Citizens v. United States." In that case, two bank employees en-
couraged the creation of a market in Indian-owned Ute Distribution Cor-
poration (UDC) stock by soliciting and accepting orders for UDC stock from
non-Indians. The Court determined that the employees were "market mak-
ers" and held that their conduct constituted a scheme or device to defraud
the Indian sellers under rule 10b-5.' As active market-makers, the em-
ployees were found to have had a duty to disclose the non-Indian market
price to the selling stockholders." The Court concluded: "These proscrip-
tions, by statute [section 10(b)] and rule [10b-5], are broad and, by repeated
use of the word 'any,' are obviously meant to be inclusive. '  Under such
an interpretation of section 10(b) and rule 10b-5 a broad class of potential
defendants is created.-
Post-1975 cases, however, reveal a retrenchment by the Supreme Court
to a conservative position regarding non-traditional insiders and the ele-
ments of section 10(b) and rule 10b-5 violations. 7  In Blue Chip Stamps v.
Manor Drug Stores," the Court addressed the issue of whether offerees of a
stock offering could maintain private causes of action when they alleged that
the offeror has violated rule lob-5, but when the plaintiffs were neither
purchasers nor sellers of the offered shares.' The Court held that only an
61. See, e.g., Superintendent of Ins. v. Bankers Life & Cas. Co., 404 U.S. 6 (1971). In
Bankers Life, the petitioner argued that a corporation it was liquidating was defrauded by a
fraudulent sale of its securities. Id. at 7. The fraud was perpetrated by an individual who
conspired to use funds owned by the corporation rather than outside monies to purchase its
securities. Id. at 7-9. The Court held that a § 10() violation occurred because the corporation
was injured through a deceptive device that precluded it from receiving compensation from the
sale of its securities. Id. at 10. The Court stated that "§ 10(b) must be read flexibly, not tech-
nically and restrictively." Id. at 12. Similarly, in SEC v. Capital Gains Research Bureau, Inc.,
375 U.S. 180 (1963), the Court observed that the securities laws had as their purpose full
disclosure rather than caveat emptor. Id. at 186. The legislation must be read "flexibly to
effectuate its remedial purposes." Id. at 195.
62. 406 U.S. 128 (1972).
63. Id. at 153. The employees failed to disclose to the Indian shareholders that higher stock
sale prices were available in the non-Indian market than in the Indian market, where Indians
traded only among themselves.
64. Id.
65. Id. at 151. See notes 24 & 25 and accompanying text supra.
66. See text accompanying notes 45-47 supra.
67. See Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore, 439 U.S. 322 (1979) (SEC injunction suit has col-
lateral estoppel effect even though it was tried without a jury, result being to deprive defen-
dants of jury trial in private suit); Piper v. Chris-Craft Indus., Inc., 430 U.S. 1 (1977) (exchange
offeror has no implied cause of action against rival offeror); United Hous. Foundation, Inc. v.
Forman, 421 U.S. 837 (1975) (shareholders of stock in a nonprofit housing cooperative do not
own "securities" within the 1933 Act or 1934 Act and are not proper parties to a private suit
under rule 10b-5). See generally Froelich & Spiegal, Standing of Federal Securities Plaintiffs-
Which Way the Trend, 24 DEPAUL L. REv. 510 (1975); Whitaker & Rotch, The Supreme Court
and the Counter Revolution in Securities Regulation, 30 ALA. L. REV. 335 (1979).
68. 421 U.S. 723 (1974).
69. Id. at 725.
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actual purchaser of shares could invoke rule 10b-5. 70 It feared that failure to
follow that principle could lead to a widely expanded class of plaintiffs and
foster vexatious litigation." The Court also recognized that the "very pen-
dancy of a lawsuit" could disrupt normal business operations unrelated to
the lawsuit.
72
The Court's opinion in Aaron v. SEC 13 is a further illustration of the
trend. Aaron emphasized the requirement of scienter in a private cause of
action under section 10(b) and rule 10b-5. The Court narrowly interpreted
section 10(b)'s language7 to conclude that the section refers to knowing or
intentional misconduct. 7' The Supreme Court's decision in Chiarella is
apparently consistent with the post-1975 trend. The Court refused to affirm
Chiarella's conviction, fearing that otherwise it would create, in effect, a
general duty for all those in the securities markets to disclose nonpublic
information or to refrain from trading on that information.7"
THE MAJORITY's ANALYSIS
Despite the general policy in favor of investor protection, the majority'
held that Chiarella's conduct was not violative of section 10(b) or rule 10b-5
because a duty to disclose before trading does not arise from mere posses-
sion of nonpublic market information.7 ' The Court stressed the prerequisite
affirmative duty to disclose and relied upon the common law fraud doctrine
which requires the presence of a fiduciary relationship giving rise to such a
duty.7 9 The foundation for the Court's argument was In re Cady, Roberts &
70. Id. at 731.
71. Id. at 739. The Court quoted with approval Judge Hufstedler's dissent in the Ninth
Circuit's decision of Blue Chip Stamps:
The purchaser-seller rule has maintained the balances built into the congressional
scheme by permitting damage actions to be brought only by those persons whose
active participation in the marketing transaction promises enforcement of the statute
without risk of abuse of the litigation process and without distorting the securities
market.
Id. (quoting Manor Drug Stores v. Blue Chip Stamps, 492 F.2d 136, 147 (9th Cir. 1973) (Huf-
stedler, J., dissenting)).
72. 421 U.S. at 740.
73. 100 S. Ct. 1945 (1980).
74. See note 39 and accompanying text supra.
75. 100 S. Ct. at 1956. The Court, in essence, reaffirmed its decision in Ernst & Ernst v.
Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185 (1976), a case in which the terms "manipulative," "device," and
"contrivance" were found to refer clearly to "knowing," "knaving or intentional misconduct." Id.
at 197-201.
76. 445 U.S. at 233.
77. Chiarella was a six to three decision, with two dissenting opinions. However, Justice
Brennan concurred only with the judgment, preferring Chief Justice Burger's dissent as the
correct interpretation of the substantive law of section 10(b). Id. at 238-39. Justice Marshall
joined in the dissent written by Justice Blackmun. Id. at 245-52.
78. Id. at 235.
79. Id. at 228. The Court observed that a relationship of trust and confidence between
insiders of a corporation and its shareholders gives rise to a duty to disclose or refrain from
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Co.,' where the SEC grounded the disclosure duty on the existence of two
elements. The SEC stated first that there must be a relationship permitting
access to material information unavailable to the public, and second, that
unfairness must result from allowing an insider to trade on such
information."' The Supreme Court in Chiarella, however, focused upon the
relationship factor that creates a duty to disclose s2 ignoring the unfairness
element. The Court found that the requisite relationship did not exist be-
tween the petitioner and the sellers of the target company stock.1 Conclud-
ing that Chiarella was not a corporate insider, the Court observed that he
had not received any confidential information from the target companies and
therefore was not a tippee.84 Because no relationship existed between
Chiarella and the sellers of the target company stock, no duty arose to dis-
close the nonpublic tender offer information.
The majority criticized the Second Circuit's" determination of to whom
the duty to disclose applies." The appellate court had affirmed Chiarella's
trading in the corporation's securities. Id. The notion of disclosure of nonpublic information or
abstention from trading was first articulated in SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833
(2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 1005 (1971), wherein the court stated:
Thus, anyone in possession of material inside information must either disclose it
to the investing public, or, if he is disabled from disclosing it in order to protect a
corporate confidence, or chooses not to do so, must abstain from trading in or
recommending the securities concerned while such inside information remains un-
disclosed.
Id. at 848.
80. 40 S.E.C. 907 (1962).
81. See notes 50-53 and accompanying text supra.
82. 445 U.S. at 227-28. The "relationship test" utilized by the Court is based on fiduciary or
trust concepts. As support for this position, the Court cited SEC v. Great Am. Indus., Inc., 407
F.2d 453, 460 (2d Cir. 1968) (to read rule 1ob-5 as imposing duty of disclosure on those other
than insiders would require "most careful consideration"), cert. denied, 395 U.S. 920 (1969);
General Time Corp. v. Tally Indus. Inc., 403 F.2d 159, 164 (2d Cir. 1967) (knowing of no rule
imposing an obligation to disclose on those without insider status or fiduciary relation), cert.
denied, 393 U.S. 1026 (1969); Kohler v. Kohler Co., 319 F.2d 634, 637 (7th Cir. 1963) (§
10(b) creates a form of fiduciary relationship between insiders and outsiders with whom they
deal); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 551(2)(a) (1977) (matters known to an individual by
virtue of fiduciary or similar relation to be disclosed). For a general discussion of fiduciary
responsibility, see 3 L. Loss, SECURITIES REGULATION 1445-53 (2d ed. 1961); 6 id. 3557-72
(1969).
83. 445 U.S. at 231-35.
84. Id. If Chiarella had received confidential information from the target company, he
would have been classified as a "tippee." Tippees are persons given inside information by insid-
ers in other than the insider's business capacity. BR OMBERC & LOWENFELS, supra note 13, §
7.5(2). See Keohnert v. Texstar Corp., 286 F. Supp. 340 (S.D. Texas), (tippee is person having
access via insider to information to be used only for corporate purposes and not for anyone's
personal benefit), aff'd, 412 F.2d 700 (5th Cir. 1969). Tippees of corporate insiders have been
held liable under § 10(b) based on their duty to avoid profiting from inside information that
they know is confidential. Shapiro v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 495 F.2d
228, 237-38 (2d Cir. 1974).
85. United States v. Chiarella, 588 F.2d 1358 (2d Cir. 1978), cert. granted, 441 U.S. 942
(1979).
86. 445 U.S. at 231-35.
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conviction by holding that the duty to disclose material nonpublic informa-
tion falls upon "[a]nyone-corporate or not"" who regularly receives such
information. Its decision rested on a parity principle-that the federal se-
curities laws were created to provide a system of "equal access to informa-
tion necessary for reasoned and intelligent investment decisions.""s The Su-
preme Court refused to extend liability under section 10(b) and rule 1Ob-5.
Such an extension, the Court stated, would impose a general duty on all
participants in market transactions either to disclose nonpublic information
or to refrain from trading on the basis of such information. 9 According to
the Court, a broad duty should not be properly imposed in the absence of
explicit evidence of congressional intent. The Court concluded that with-
out such evidence, the mere possession of nonpublic information would not
be considered fraudulent absent an initial duty to speak.9
Having determined that the petitioner owed no duty to the sellers of the
target company's stock, the Court then addressed the government's conten-
tion that Chiarella had breached a duty to the acquiring corporation. The
government contended that such a duty arose when Chiarella traded on in-
formation obtained by virtue of his position as an employee of the printer
hired by that corporation. 2  The Court did not resolve that issue, however,
because it had not been submitted to the jury." The question of whether a
87. 588 F.2d at 1365 (emphasis in original).
88. Id. at 1362. For other applications of the parity of information principle, see Coates v.
SEC, 394 U.S. 979 (1969) (rule 10b-5 is based on policy that investors have equal access to
information and is an implementation of Congress' purpose that all investors should have equal
access to rewards of trading); Smallwood v. Pearl Brewing Co., 489 F.2d 519, 600 (5th Cir.
1974) ("prompt disclosure helps to insure ... equal access to market information"); SEC v.
Texas Gulf Sulphur, 401 F.2d 833, 848 (2d Cir. 1968) ("rule based on justifiable expectation of
securities marketplace that all investors . . . have relatively equal access to material informa-
tion"), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 1005 (1971).
There is, however, little legislative support for the parity of information approach. Refer-
ences in the congressional reports, which are used as authority for this concept, deal mainly
with the disclosure provisions of the 1934 Act. H.R. REP. No. 1383, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 5, 6,
11 (1934), reprinted in 5 ELLENBERGER & MAHAR, supra note 1, at Item 21; S. REP, No. 792,
73d Cong., 2d Sess. 3 (1934), reprinted in 5 ELLENBERGER & MAHAR, supra note 1, at Item 17.
89. 445 U.S. at 233.
90. Id. at 233-34.
91. Id. The Court acknowledged that silence in the purchase or sale of securities may be
fraudulent under § 10(b), but liability would be grounded on an initial duty to disclose the
relevant nonpublic information. Id. at 229-30. See Affiliated Ute Citizens v. United States, 406
U.S. 128 (1972). In that case, certain bank employees may have made no representations or
recommendations regarding specific securities; yet, the duty arose because the employees
agreed to act on behalf of the holders of those securities. See also SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur
Co., 401 F.2d 833 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 1005 (1971). In Texas Gulf Sulphur,
the Second Circuit found the defendants, who were corporate insiders, guilty of violating rule
10b-5 based on a pre-existing duty to disclose which arose out of their positions with the com-
pany. No deception was practiced in the sale itself. Id. at 853-54.
92. 445 U.S. at 235-36.
93. The SEC argued that the district court's jury charge had stressed that § 10(b) and rule
10b-5 were violated by a fraud perpetrated on "any person" in connection with a purchase or
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person trading on material nonpublic information has a duty to "disclose or
refrain" to parties other than actual buyers or sellers, therefore, was re-
served by the Court. That the Court left the issue unresolved is perplexing
in light of Justice Stevens' concurring opinion' which noted that only actual
purchasers or sellers may raise a private rule 10b-5 action.' Because the
acquiring companies were not purchasers or sellers in the transactions at
issue they would be precluded from raising a cause of action under rule
10b-5. Therefore, the Court was needlessly hesitant to address the issue and
refute the government's theory.
The purpose of the federal securities laws is to create a securities market
which provides reliable information for investors and prevents investors from
being harmed by those with trading advantages.' Because Chiarella's acts
apparently struck at the very center of the infractions the securities laws
were designed to prevent, the Supreme Court's reversal of his conviction
stands in contrast to legislative expectations of the protective function of the
1934 Act.
CRITICISM OF THE MAJORITY'S OPINION
Chiarella represents another indication of the Supreme Court's apparent
desire to contract rule 10b-5 liability." The Court's analysis in Chiarella
may be criticized on several grounds. First, the Court failed to recognize the
sale of securities. Because the phrase contained no limitation on the category of persons who
may be harmed by a fraudulent scheme, the SEC asserted that it reached fraudulent practices
aimed at businesses as well as individual investors. The SEC concluded that the district court's
charge permitted the jury to find that petitioner's conduct was a fraud on both the sellers of the
target company's stock and the acquiring companies. Brief for Respondent at 28-30, Chiarella v.
United States, 445 U.S. 222 (1980).
The majority, however, concluded that the jury instructions allowed the petitioner to be
convicted merely because of his failure to disclose material nonpublic information to the sellers.
No references to a duty owed to the acquiring corporations were included. 445 U.S. at 235-37.
The Court refused to consider an issue that had not been submitted to the jury. Id. See Dunn
v. United States, 442 U.S. 100, 106 (1979) (upholding conviction on a charge not presented to
jury offends most basic due process notions); Rewis v. United States, 401 U.S. 808, 814 (1971)
(jury not charged with elements of crime of which defendants were convicted). Cf. Eaton v.
City of Tulsa, 415 U.S. 697, 698-99 (1974) (per curiam) (question is not upon what evidence trial
judge could find petitioner guilty, but rather upon what evidence trial judge did so).
94. 445 U.S. at 237-39 (Stevens, J., concurring).
95. Id. See also Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723 (1975). For a
discussion of Blue Chip Stamps, see notes 68-72 and accompanying text supra.
96. S. REP. No. 1455, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 68 (1934), reprinted in 5 ELLENBERGER &
MAHAR, supra note 1, at Item 21. See also SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833, 853
(2d Cir. 1968) (dominant congressional purpose is promotion of free marketplace), cert. denied,
404 U.S. 1005 (1971); Mitchell v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 446 F.2d 90, 101 (10th Cir. 1971)
(equalization of bargaining position promotes investor confidence), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 1004
(1971).
97. H.R. REP. No. 1383, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 1-5 (1934), reprinted in 5 ELLENBERGER &
MAHAR, supra note 1, at Item 18. See notes 32-39 and accompanying text supra.
98. See notes 67-76 and accompanying text supra.
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language of the securities laws which suggests that their primary purpose is
to protect the investing public from individuals in a position to manipulate
the market. Second, the Court's utilization of case law is subject to criticism
because its unduly narrow interpretations of those cases did not take into
account the protective policies behind the section and rule. Finally, the
Chiarella court refused without adequate explanation to adopt a "parity of
information" rule that the Second Circuit suggested would impose liability
on acts such as those committed by Chiarella.
The Court initially observed that the language of section 10(b) does not
reveal whether silence may be a manipulative or deceptive device."'  It
further noted that the enactment of rule 10b-5 was unaccompanied by guide-
lines indicating that silence might constitute the type of manipulative or
deceptive device prohibited by the rule. ""' Although the Court was tech-
nically accurate, statements made by the drafters of section 10(b) indicate
that their intent was to create an expansive net of liability over those who
violate the section. 0' Significantly, the principal drafter '02 observed that the
pertinent section meant that "[t]hou shalt not devise any cunning devices" i,
and was intended to be a catch-all clause for ensnaring those who employed
manipulative devices.' °4 The catch-all purpose has since been adopted by
99. 445 U.S. at 226. Justice Powell, writing for the majority, focused on the legal effect of
Chiarella's silence. Id. The Court determined that only rules 10b-5(a) and (c) were necessarily at
issue. Id. at 226 n.5. Rule 10b-5(b), not considered by the Court, relates to untrue statements
or material omissions of facts. It was deemed inapplicable because the petitioner made no actual
statements in his securities scheme. Id. See also note 91 supra.
100. Securities Exchange Act Release No. 3230 (May 21, 1942). The release explained that
the rule had been created to "close a loophole" in the securities laws by prohibiting the acquisi-
tion of securities through fraudulent means. Prior to the release, the antifraud rules applied
solely to brokers and dealers. After the release, however, the antifraud proscription was ex-
tended to both individuals and companies. id.
101. 78 CONG. REc. 8164 (1934), reprinted in 4 ELLENBERGER & MAHAR, supra note 1, at
Item 10; 78 CONG. REC. 2271 (1934), reprinted in 4 ELLENBERGER & MAHAR, supra note 1, at
Item 5; H.R. REP. No. 1838, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 32-33 (1934), reprinted in 5 ELLENBERGER &
MAHAR, supra note 1, at Item 20.
102. Thomas G. Corcoran, counsel for the Reconstruction Finance Corporation, was selected
by the Roosevelt administration in its effort to enact the legislation that eventually was incorpo-
rated in the 1934 Act.
103. Corcoran's reference was to § 9, which was renumbered § 10 before the proposed leg-
islation became law. The government's theory behind § 9 was that it would proscribe manipula-
tive devices having the effect of misleading the investing public as to the actual value of secu-
rities. Such a rule was necessary, the government argued, to prevent a recurrence of those
securities market practices that preceded the 1929 stock market crash. H.R. REP. No. 1383,
73d Cong., 2d Sess. 2-3 (1934), reprinted in 5 ELLENBERGER & MAHAR, supra note 1, at Item
18.
104. Mr. Corcoran presented the government's position as one which gave the SEC broad
authority to deal with such devices via § 9, described as a "catch-all clause" to prevent man-
ipulative devices. Id. Although this evidence about the breadth of § 9 is only semi-official (testi-
mony before the House hearing on the proposed 1934 Act legislation), it firmly indicates that
the section was intended to be expansive.
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several courts." s  Consistent with this acceptance of an all inclusive class of
violators, the SEC itself interpreted rule 10b-5 as prohibiting fraud by any
person in securities purchases." Based upon this interpretation of congres-
sional intent, and administrative and judicial understanding of that intent,
the Chiarella majority should have found the petitioner's conduct within the
scope of proscribed activity and therefore subject to sanctions. Such a deter-
mination would promote investor confidence in the market and deter others
from instigating manipulative schemes. Arguably, therefore, the Court
should have accorded more weight to the effect of Chiarella's acts, especially
in light of the SEC's express determination that section 10(b) and rule 10b-5
are applicable to any person.
The Chiarella Court, ignoring the protective purposes behind the anti-
fraud provisions of the securities laws, interpreted In re Cady, Roberts &
Co."7 as imposing a duty to disclose based on the relationship that creates
the access allowing an individual to receive inside information.0 8 Couching
its analysis solely in terms of traditional insiders,'" the Court failed to ack-
nowledge that the SEC had instructed in Cady, Roberts that liability for
section 10(b) violations is not limited to those occupying traditional insider
positions."" A more faithful reading of Cady, Roberts, however, is that ac-
cess is the crucial element, not the traditional insider relationship creating
that access."' Indeed, the SEC has specifically rejected the special rela-
105. Herpick v. Wallace, 430 F.2d 792, 801 (5th Cir. 1970) (§ 10(b) written as a "catch all" to
reach practices contrary to public interest or interest of investors); SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur
Co., 401 F.2d 833, 859 (2d Cir. 1968) (recognizing that from its inception § 10(b) has always
been acknowledged as a catch-all), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 1005 (1971); Garner v. Pearson,
[1973-1974 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 94,549 (M.D. Fla. 1974) (statute and
rule designed to encompass infinite variety of manipulative devices).
106. 8 SEC ANNUAL REPORT 10 (1942). The SEC noted that rule 10b-5 was adopted as an
additional protection to investors. Id.
107. 40 S.E.C. 907 (1962).
108. 445 U.S. at 226-29. The Court interpreted the Cady, Roberts relationship criterion as
based on fiduciary principles existing between the shareholders of a corporation and insiders
who received nonpublic information via their corporate position.
109. Id.
110. The SEC directed that officers, directors, and controlling shareholders "do not exhaust
the classes of persons upon whom there is such an obligation [to disclose nonpublic
information]." SEC v. Cady, Roberts & Co., 40 S.E.C. 907, 912 (1961). The SEC emphasized
that the antifraud provisions pointedly referred to "any person." Id. It based the obligation to
disclose on two principal elements:
First, the existence of a relationship, giving access, directly or indirectly, to in-
formation intended to be available only for a corporate purpose and not for the
personal benefit of anyone, and second, the inherent unfairness involved where a
party takes advantage of such information knowing it is unavailable to those with
whom he is dealing.
Id.
111. See BROMBERG & LOwENFELS, supra note 13, § 7.4(6)(b) ("People have been agonizing
for years over the question, 'Who is an insider?' The answer is not to be found in organizational
charts or other well-defined relationships. It is to be found in 'access' and 'unfairness,' according
to the test just quoted").
DEPAUL LAW REVIEW
tionship test in favor of an access criteria that makes an actor liable under
the antifraud provisions when he trades on nonpublic information which
places him at an advantage in the market."' Similarly, the Court failed to
acknowledge the "possession test" enunciated in SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur
Co."3 which provided that anyone in possession of material inside informa-
tion must disclose it or refrain from trading."4 The possession test has re-
ceived favorable responses from courts and commentators alike."' The pol-
icy underlying rule 10b-5, as the court in Texas Gulf Sulphur recognized,
stems from the justifiable expectation of equal access to market information
among investors." 6 That expectation, coupled with a viable possession test,
could have provided the majority in Chiarella with a justification for affirm-
ing the Second Circuit's decision. The Court, however, ignored the compel-
ling logic of Texas Gulf Sulphur and instead relied upon an unduly narrow
interpretation of who may be liable under the antifraud provisions of the
securities laws.
The Court attempted to parallel Chiarella's conduct to the defendant's
conduct in General Time Corp. v. Talley Industries, Inc."7 The majority
112. In re Investors Management Co., 44 S.E.C. 633, 644 (1971). In that case, the SEC
decided that one in possession of material nonpublic information, which by itself places him in a
superior position to other investors, acquired a relationship with respect to that information
within the purview and restraints of the antifraud provisions. Id. The Commission rejected the
contention that no violation would occur unless the recipient actually occupied a special rela-
tionship with the issuer that provided access to nonpublic information. Id. at 643.
113. 401 F.2d 833, 848 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 1005 (1971).
114. Id.
115. See Shapiro v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 495 F.2d 228, 236-37 (2d
Cir. 1974) (possession test is correct to effectuate the policies behind the section and rule);
Strong v. France, 474 F.2d 747, 752 (9th Cir. 1973) (duty to disclose arises upon possession of
inside information); Radiation Dynamics, Inc. v. Goldmuntz, 464 F.2d 876, 887 (2d Cir. 1972)
(rule 1ob-5 intended to prevent those in possession of material inside information from using
that information to their own advantage when dealing with others not in possession of same
information); SEC v. Lum's, Inc., 365 F. Supp. 1046, 1057-58 (S.D.N.Y. 1973) (defendant in
possession of material nonpublic information owed a duty to investing public not to disclose it to
someone for his or her personal use); SEC v. Shapiro, 349 F. Supp. 46, 52-53 (S.D.N.Y. 1972)
(section and rule aimed at promoting fair and honest market by preventing those in possession
of material inside information from profiting).
Commentators have similarly endorsed the possession test. See Painter, Rule lOb-5: The Re-
codification Thicket, 45 ST. JOHNs L. REV. 699, 708 (1971) (possession is the better test); Sand-
ler & Conwill, Texas Gulf Sulphur: Reform in the Securities Marketplace, 30 Olo ST. L.J.
225, 238-42 (1969) (anyone in possession of material inside information can take advantage of the
public and should be subject to rule 10b-5; no justification for allowing profit at public's ex-
pense); Note, How Big a House of Cards? Private Actions and Insider Trading Under Rule
10b-5, 6 SAN DIEGo L. REV. 243, 263 (1969) (recognizing the possession test as creating a larger
class of potential defendants, furthering dissemination of information, and creating liability for
heretofore nonculpable conduct).
116. 401 F.2d at 848. See notes 56-58 and accompanying text supra.
117. 403 F.2d 159 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 1026 (1969). For additional support,
the majority also cited SEC v. Great Am. Indus., Inc., 407 F.2d 453 (2d Cir. 1968), cert.
denied, 395 U.S. 920 (1969), and Kohler v. Kohler Co., 319 F.2d 634 (7th Cir. 1963). Great
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cited General Time for the proposition that a purchaser of securities owes no
duty to a prospective seller if he or she is neither an insider nor a fiduciary
having an obligation to reveal material facts."' The majority's reliance on
General Time was misplaced because the purchasers in that case were ten-
der offerors not subject to a duty to disclose nonpublic information in their
possession."' Chiarella, however, was not a tender offeror and therefore
could not claim an exclusion from the disclosure requirement."' ° Rather,
Chiarella fit within the category of a "market insider," a term suggested by
the Second Circuit to describe a person having regular access to market
information. 2' By virtue of his position as a financial printer, Chiarella had
access "to the most confidential information in the world of finance" 22
-advance notice of corporate tender offers. Adoption of the "market insid-
er" category would have allowed the majority to act consistently with one of
the major purposes of the antifraud provisions-the protection of the in-
tegrity of the securities market.
American Industries observed that placing a duty of disclosure on those other than traditional
insiders or broker-dealers would be "occupying new ground" and would necessitate "the most
careful consideration." 407 F.2d at 460. The Second Circuit, however, appeared to state only
that careful consideration should be exercised before expanding liability, not that expansion is
prohibited. The Chiarella Court's refusal to interpret Great American Industries as leaving open
the possibility for "careful consideration" of a broader duty rule is at odds with the purposes
behind the antifraud statutes.
Kohler recognized that one of the primary purposes behind the 1934 Act was to proscribe the
use of inside information by directors, officers and controlling shareholders. 319 F.2d at 638.
The Kohler court then extended the principle to include corporations themselves. Id. Thus, the
expansion of established doctrines in the securities law field has not been scrupulously avoided
by the courts. Chiarella, in fact, would have been an ideal case in which to base an extension to
"new grounds," supported by the policy behind the antifraud laws and the catch-all application
of § 10(b).
118. 445 U.S. at 229 (citing General Time Corp. v. Talley Indus., Inc., 403 F.2d 159, 164
(2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 1026 (1969)).
119. 403 F.2d at 164-65. The Second Circuit observed that the transactions at issue in General
Time predated the adoption of the Williams Act, which imposed disclosure requirements on
certain tender offerors. As a result, the tender offerors in General Time were not subject to a
duty to reveal nonpublic information in their possession. Id.
120. The appellate court rejected Chiarella's argument that he stood in the same position as
the tender offerors from which he derived his inside information. 588 F.2d at 1368 n.15. A
tender offeror, unlike Chiarella, does not regularly receive nonpublic information concerning
any stock but its own. Id. at 1366. Additionally, the offeror does not receive information but
instead creates it. Id.
121. Id. at 1365. Chief Judge Kaufman differentiated between corporate insiders and market
insiders. The latter have access to information that -affects the price of a company's securities
but that does not similarly affect a firm's earning power or assets. The Chief Judge applied the
market insider theory to Chiarella, finding that financial printers were a "central cog" in the
execution of tender offers. Id. Because of their strategic position within the securities market,
the court concluded that they must be forbidden from profiting from market information they
might acquire. Id. See also Fleischer, Mundheim & Murphy, An Initial Inquiry into the Re-
sponsibility to Disclose Market Information, 121 U. PA. L. REv. 798 (1973) [hereinafter cited as
Fleischer]. Fleischer suggested that Affiliated Ute Citizens v. United States, 406 U.S. 128
(1972), stands for the proposition that the prohibitions under the antifraud rules can be ex-
tended to those in a special relationship to the securities market. Fleischer, supra, at 819.
122. 588 F.2d at 1365.
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The majority also understated the significance of Chiarella's conduct by
erroneously interpreting the term "market information." The Court con-
cluded that the market information upon which he acted did not concern the
earning power of the target companies or their operations but only their
future plans."z  Market information, however, relates to factors which affect
the price of a company's stock, rather than its earning power or future
plans." ' As such, Chiarella's knowledge of the market information (impend-
ing tender offers) put him in a superior position to purchase target company
securities and be assured of a profit upon their sale. The Court also ignored
the effect of Chiarella's activities on the market itself. By entering the mar-
ket, he affected the price of the stock by exerting on it an artificial upward
pressure. 125
By asserting that not every occasion of financial unfairness constitutes
fraud,' the Court misread the dictates of Santa Fe Industries, Inc. v.
Green.'7 That case specifically addressed corporate mismanagement which
resulted in the unfair treatment of subsidiary shareholders.28 The share-
holders in Santa Fe, however, possessed all of the relevant information
required for an intelligent trading decision." Santa Fe therefore differs sig-
nificantly from Chiarella, in which the sellers lacked possession of all the rel-
evant information regarding the worth of their securities. If the sellers of the
target company shares had possessed the same information as Chiarella,
their most intelligent action would have been to retain possession of the
stock until the acquiring corporations made their tender offers at a price
123. 445 U.s. at 233.
124. Fleischer, supra note 121, at 799.
125. 588 F.2d at 1368.
126. 445 U.S. at 232.
127. 430 U.S. 462 (1977).
128. The corporate mismanagement arose when Santa Fe attempted to acquire the stock of a
subsidiary pursuant to the Delaware "short-form" merger statute. Santa Fe had offered the
minority shareholders $150 per share and informed them that if that price was not satisfactory,
they had the choice of obtaining an appraisal of the shares' value. Id. at 465-66. Rather than
pursuing their right of appraisal, several minority shareholders sued to set aside the merger and
recover the fair value of their stock, claiming that it was worth at least $772 per share. Id. at
467. The Court held that despite the significant price discrepancy, the minority shareholders
had no cause of action because they had been furnished with information regarding their
alternatives. Id. at 474.
129. The "intelligent investor" theory proposes that information must be disclosed according
to a measurement of the effect that factual knowledge would have on the prudent or conserva-
tive investor. SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833, 848-49 (2d Cir. 1968), cert.
denied, 404 U.S. 1005 (1971). See also List v. Fashion Park, Inc., 340 F.2d 457, 462 (2d Cir.
1965) (addressing whether reasonable person would attach importance to the infirmation in
determining his choice of action), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 811 (1965). Further, the House com-
mittee that developed the 1934 Act observed that: "No investor, no speculator, can safely buy
and sell securities upon exchanges without having an intelligent basis for forming his judgment
as to the value of the securities he buys or sells." H.R. Re,'. No. 1383, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 11
(1934), reprinted in 5 ELLIENBEIR;ER & MAHAR, supra note 1, at Item 18. See Herpick v. Wal-
lace, 430 F.2d 792, 806 (5th Cir. 1970) (Congress intended to afford investors a reasonable
opportunity to arrive at intelligent decisions).
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above the prevailing market.' 30 Santa Fe, therefore, is not authority for per-
mitting the unfairness that Chiarella practiced.
The Supreme Court disagreed with the Second Circuit's position that the
federal securities laws provide a system of equal access to information for
investment decisions.' The Court stressed that neither Congress nor the
SEC has ever adopted a "parity of information" rule and declined to do so
itself. "' 2 Manifesting the Court's recalcitrant attitude, it pointedly ignored
an early interpretation of the fundamental philosophy of the securities acts
by Representative Rayburn, Chairman of the House Committee on Inter-
state Commerce, under whose aegis the acts were developed. Rayburn ex-
plained that the purpose of the 1934 Act was to place buyers and sellers on
the same information level so as to promote honesty and integrity in secur-
ities transactions." Adherence to such a rule would promote the primary
objective of a "disclose or refrain" rule, fostering the equalization of access
to material information." This policy should be placed in the forefront of
judicial attacks on manipulative and deceptive schemes such as those prac-
ticed by Chiarella, because the antifraud provisions were primarily designed
to prevent unfair advantages among investors." The conduct that the Court
condoned in Chiarella will have a deleterious effect on the investor by mak-
ing him or her prey to schemes whereby others can use nonpublic material
information to their advantage and to the investor's detriment.
130. See note 13 supra.
131. 445 U.S. at 232.
132. Id. at 233. Refusing to acknowledge a parity of information rule, the majority myopically
feared that such a "radical departure from the established doctrine" should not be effectuated
without congressional approval. Id. The Court was unable to find support for such an extension
in the language or legislative history of § 10(b). Id. at 233-34. This interpretation painfully
ignored administrative statements and case law pointing towards the viability of an expansive
reading of § 10(b). See notes 36, 37, 39 & 100-106 and accompanying text supra.
133. Representative Rayburn, an advocate of full disclosure of nonpublic information, noted:
"The purpose of this bill is to place the owners of securities on a parity, so far as is possible,
with the management of the corporations, and to place the buyer on the same plane so far as
available information is concerned, with the seller." 77 CONc. REC. 2918 (1933), reprinted in 5
ELLENBERGER & MAHAR, supra note 1, at Item 7.
134. See Shapiro v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 495 F.2d 228, 236-37 (2d
Cir. 1974) (equal access rule necessary to promote integrity of national securities exchanges
because transactions are anonymous); Chris-Craft Indus., Inc. v. Bangor Punta Corp., 426 F.2d
569 (1970) (Lumbard, C.J.,dissenting) (fair and equal access necessary when information would
be material to investor's decision); SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833, 848, 851-52
(2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 1005 (1971) (justifiable expectation that all investors trad-
ing on impersonal securities exchanges have relatively equal access to material information);
SEC v. Cady, Roberts & Co., 40 S.E.C. 907, 912 (1961) (insider cannot use nonpublic informa-
tion to which others have no access). See generally BRomBERC & LOWENFELS, supra note 13,
§ 12.2 (equalization goal of the federal securities laws stresses information and access).
135. H.R. REP. No. 94-229, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 91-92 (1975). The recent date of this
congressional reaffirmation of the protective policy behind the antifraud laws clearly indicates
Congress' preoccupation with investor protection and market integrity.
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IMPACT OF THE DECISION
The Supreme Court's return to traditional and narrow concepts of liability
for insider trading" is especially significant because it strikes at the very
heart of section 10(b) and rule 10b-5. Concentrating on the point at which
the duty to disclose arises, 37 the Court ignored its own admission that it is
necessary to protect shareholders from insiders possessing information mate-
rial to those shareholders.'- The Court has therefore managed to create a
gap between the protective policies of the antifraud provisions of the secur-
ities laws and the vulnerable persons for whom they are intended protec-
tion. As a result, non-traditional insiders with nonpublic information may
trade securities on the basis of that information and be safe from prosecution
based on a defense of a lack of duty to disclose owed those claiming injuries.
Though consistent with the Court's recent conservative trend, Chiarella
does not fulfill the underlying philosophy of the securities laws, which are
expressly designed to protect the integrity of the market. 3 By reversing
Chiarella's conviction, the majority has implicitly condoned conduct that
"lies close to the heart of what the securities laws are intended to
prohibit.""' The majority also failed to recognize that the policy favoring
136. See notes 67-75 and accompanying text supra. Justice Blackmun, dissenting in Chia-
rella, observed that "[t]he Court continues to pursue a course, charted in certain recent deci-
sions, designed to transform section 10(b) from an intentionally elastic 'catchall' provision to one
that catches relatively little of the misbehavior that all too often makes investment in securities
a needlessly risky business for the uninitiated investor." 445 U.S. at 246 (Blackmun, J., dissent-
ing).
137. 445 U.S. at 231-32. The Court determined that the duty to disclose arises only when a
"fiduciary or similar relation of trust" exists between the parties to a transaction. Id. See text
accompanying notes 93-95 supra.
138. 445 U.S. at 231-32. The majority quoted Speed v. Transamerica Corp., 99 F. Supp. 808
(D. Del.), reaffd on later motion, 100 F. Supp. 461 (D. Del.), modified on other grounds, 235
F.2d 369 (3d Cir. 1956), for the proposition that the duty of disclosure is an attempt to provide
an equalization of bargaining position so that shareholders may have the information necessary
to make informed decisions in any transactions. Id. at 829. In Speed, Chief Judge Leahy noted
that the fundamental purpose of the 1934 Act was to outlaw the use of inside information which
worked to the detriment of uninformed public security holders. Id.
139. See, e.g., Superintendent of Ins. v. Bankers Life & Cas. Co., 404 U.S. 6, 12 (1971)
(§ 10(b) to be read flexibly, not technically and restrictively; Congress designed the statute to
bar deceptive schemes); Shapiro v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 495 F.2d 228,
235 (2d Cir. 1974) (purpose behind § 10(b) and rule 10b-5 is to protect public and achieve fair
dealing in securities marketplace); International Controls Corp. v. Vesco, 490 F.2d 1334, 1345
(2d Cir. 1974) ("umbrella of protection" over securities transactions intended to promote in-
formed decision making by investors).
140. 445 U.S. at 245 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). Justice Blackmun observed that Chiarella
occupied a relationship which gave him "intimate access" to nonpublic information which was
intended only to be used for a corporate purpose and "not for the personal benefit of anyone."
He noted that the petitioner took advantage of this nonpublic information by trading in the
target company's stocks to the distinct disadvantage ofthe shareholders. Id. at 252. Actions such
as those practiced by Chiarella harm the integrity that the securities maket must maintain in
order to be a viable component of the national economy.
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equal access will be thwarted due to the inability to overcome advantages
possessed by those, such as Chiarella, with nonpublic information.' Only a
liberal interpretation of section 10(b) and rule 10b-5 would foster the protec-
tion that the section and the rule are intended to provide." 2
Further, the majority's refusal to extend liability to "market insiders" for
rule 10b-5 violations does not coincide with the Supreme Court's previous
efforts to effectuate the remedial nature of the rule."3 The concept of "mar-
ket insider" liability is premised on the fundamental notion that an indi-
vidual should not be permitted to profit from using information obtained
through his or her position in the securities market."t ' The doctrine should
be used to prevent those in preferred positions, such as Chiarella, from
profiting based on the use of information so obtained.
The majority conspicuously left unresolved whether Chiarella's conduct
might have been an actionable rule 10b-5 violation by the acquiring com-
panies who were not parties to the transactions at issue, rather than the
sellers of the target company stock.' 5 In light of Blue Chip Stamps v.
Manor Drug Stores,'4 which held that only actual purchasers or sellers pos-
sess a private cause of action under the section or the rule, the Court may
be intimating a relaxation of that strict standard.17
It must be noted that Chiarella's conviction was criminal rather than civil, which may to some
extent explain the majority's willingness to reverse the lower court conviction. Professor Brom-
berg notes that criminal sanctions have not been extensive or significant even though rule 10b-5
has been held valid in a criminal context. See BROMBER(; & LOWENFELS, supra note 13, § 10.3.
Further, by the time of the Supreme Court disposition, Chiarella had made restitution of his
profits to those from whom he had bought the stock.
141. See note 58 and accompanying text supra.
142. 15 U.S.C. § 78(b) (1976). That section states that the necessity for regulation of the
securities market exists, inter alia, because "the prices of securities on such [national] exchanges
and markets are susceptible to manipulation and control .. ." Id.
143. See Affiliated Ute Citizens v. United States, 406 U.S. 128, 151 (1973) (quoting SEC v.
Capital Gains Research Bureau, Inc., 375 U.S. 180, 195 (1963)) (securities legislation to be read
"not technically and restrictively, but flexibly to effectuate its remedial purpose"). The Affiliated
Ute Court applied that theory to the factual situation before it by holding that defendants Gale
and Haslem engaged in market making activities, and, therefore, an extension of rule 10b-5 was
warranted to reach their deceptive conduct. 406 U.S. at 150-54.
144. See Note, Rule 10b-5: Birth of the Concept of Market Insider and its Application in a
Criminal Case-United States v. Chiarella, 8 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 467, 476-77 (1980). The au-
thor concludes that a person who receives nonpublic market information, yet who has no rela-
tionship with the corporate source of the information, should be precluded from realizing a
profit based on his or her use of that information.
145. 445 U.S. at 237-38. The Court reached no decision on this point because it claimed that
the jury had not been properly charged about the elements of the duty owed to the acquiring
corporation. Id. at 236. Because of the alleged improper charge, the majority stated "we will
not speculate upon whether such a duty exists, whether it has been breached, or whether such
a breach constitutes a violation of section 10(b)." Id.
146. 421 U.S. 723 (1975). For a more detailed discussion of the case, see notes 68-72 and
accompanying text supra.
147. If such a relaxation is occurring, it appears confined to § 10(b) and rule 10b-5. Other
cases suggest that the Court is narrowing the scope of implied private causes of action. In
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Nevertheless, resolution of the situation presented by Chiarella may soon
be achieved by tender offer rules recently adopted by the SEC ' which
would impose "disclose-or-refrain" obligations on any person having knowl-
edge of an impending tender offer. Rule 14e-3 requires that any person in
possession of material nonpublic information relating to a tender offer refrain
from trading in that issue unless, prior to purchase, the person publicly
announces possession of that information and its source.' 1 Recognizing the
gap left open by the Chiarella decision, the SEC explained the basis for its
new rule: "The Commission continues to believe that such conduct [trading
on nonpublic information] undermines the integrity of, and investor confi-
dence in, the securities markets, and that persons who unlawfully obtain or
misappropriate material, nonpublic information violate rule 10b-5 when they
trade on such information.""' Thus, rule 14e-3 gives the judiciary a solid
foundation for forbidding manipulative and deceptive conduct.
ALTERNATIVE THEORIES OF LIABILITY
The Supreme Court could have followed one of several alternate theories
in resolving Chiarella without creating a general duty of disclosure,5' all of
which would have barred damaging transactions l"2 without unduly interfering
with legitimate business practices. " Among the available alternatives was
Transamerica Mortgage Advisors v. Lewis, 444 U.S. 11 (1979), a 5-4 Court held that no private
cause of action existed under the Investment Advisors Act of 1940, 15 U.S.C. §§ 80b-1 to -21
(1976), even though § 206 of that Act proscribes certain conduct detrimental to clients of invest-
ment advisors. Id. at 16. The Court observed that the only section of the Act authorizing any
suit to enforce its provisions was § 209 which permits the SEC to bring suit in federal district
court. Id. at 14. Similarly, in Touche Ross & Co. v. Redington, 442 U.S. 560 (1979), the Court
held that no implied private cause of action arose from an accounting firm's alleged breach of
duty under § 17(a) of the 1934 Act. Id. at 579. Section 17(a) requires broker-dealers to keep
such records and file such reports as the SEC may prescribe. The Court noted that § 17(a) by
its terms grants no implied rights to any identifiable class and proscribes no conduct as unlaw-
ful. Further, the 1934 Act's legislative history does not address the issue of private remedies
under § 17 (a).
148. 45 Fed. Reg. 60,410 (1980) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. § 240.14e-3).
149. Id. at 60,413-14.
150. Id. at 60,412. In its comments upon the proposed rule, the SEC expressed concern
about trading on the basis of nonpublic information. It noted that such trading creates dispari-
ties in market information, promotes market disruption, and harms investors who sell their
shares without the knowledge that a tender offer is imminent.
151. The majority refused to affirm Chiarella's conviction fearing that to do so would impose
a disclosure duty broader than that intended by Congress when it enacted the securities laws.
445 U.S. at 233.
152. The dissent observed that the Senate, in its report regarding the nature of the 1934 Act,
found certain transactions to encompass "those manipulative and deceptive practices which have
been demonstrated to fulfill no useful function." 445 U.S. at 241 (Burger, C.J., dissenting)
(quoting S. REP. No. 792, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 6 (1934), reprinted in 5 ELLENBERGER & MAHAR,
supra note 1, at Item 17).
153. Antifraud provisions would not necessarily threaten business practices helpful to the
securities market. For example, the Williams Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78m(d)(1) (1976), permits a
tender offeror to purchase up to 5% of its target company's stock before disclosure of its acquisi-
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the special facts doctrine." That doctrine recognizes that one party's super-
ior knowledge of certain facts might have a deleterious effect on another
party.'55 Another theory involves quasi-insiders, recognizing that certain
non-traditional insiders are in such a position in the market as to impose on
them traditional insider duties." The misappropriation theory was another
alternative open to the Court.'57  Under that theory, information acquired by
misappropriation is required to be divulged or retained until made public. -
The special facts doctrine has long acknowledged that particular situations
and relationships may be of such a character as to create a duty to speak;
silence, therefore, violates that duty.' Although the doctrine had its ori-
gins in the common law tort of actionable misrepresentation, it fits easily
within the policy of equal access that underlies the antifraud provisions of
the securities laws."' The special facts doctrine has been adopted by courts
and commentators alike. They concur that it is particularly applicable to
situations involving one party's knowledge of material facts which might
work an unfair advantage on another party with whom he or she is
dealing. 161 The usefulness of such a doctrine is illustrated in Chiarella be-
tion plans is required. The period between the tender offeror's purchases and mandatory disclo-
sure allows the tender offeror to "test the water"; in effect it allows the tender offeror to
determine if purchasing the entire outstanding stock of the target will be profitable.
154. See 445 U.S. at 246 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
155. See Frigitemp Corp. v. Financial Dynamics Fund, Inc., 524 F.2d 275, 283 (2d Cir.
1975).
156. Zweig v. Hearst Corp., 594 F.2d 1261 (9th Cir. 1979). Zweig concerned a financial
columnist who published a favorable article about a particular company. Before he published
the article he purchased 5,000 shares of its stock. The day after the article appeared and the
price had risen he sold 2,000 of his 5,000 shares, thereby recouping his initial investment and
retaining the remainder of the shares for future profits. Id. at 1264-65. The Ninth Circuit held
that the columnist was a quasi-insider and that his conduct violated § 10(b) and rule 10b-5 just
as a corporate insider would have if he or she had traded on the basis of material nonpublic
information. Id. at 1267.
157. See 445 U.S. at 240 (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
158. Id.
159. F. HARPER & F. JAMES, LAW OF TORTS § 7.14 (1956) (when facts in possession of one
party are not available to other party, failure to disclose may be active concealment and action-
able).
160. In SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833, 848 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 404
U.S. 1005 (1971), the court specifically referred to the special facts doctrine as a source for rule
lob-5. Explaining that the purpose of rule lOb-5 was to promote confidence in the market and
equal access to material information, the court found that misuse of special facts stymied these
goals.
161. Lewelling v. First Cal. Co., 564 F.2d 1277, 1280 (9th Cir. 1977) (rule lOb-5 requires
those possessing material information not available to other party to disclose it or refrain from
trading; total silence in the face of this duty is actionable); United States v. Charnay, 537 F.2d
341, 348-50 (9th Cir.) (language of rule 10b-5 does not mean only insiders; rather, it applies to
anyone with material information), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1000 (1976); SEC v. Texas Gulf Sul-
phur Co., 401 F.2d 833, 848 (2d Cir. 1968) (use of special facts may violate policy of rule
lOb-5), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 1005 (1971); List v. Fashion Park Inc., 340 F.2d 457, 461-62 (2d
Cir. 1964) (rule 10b-5 as stringent as common law rule that there can be fraud even though
perfect silence was kept), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 811 (1965); Speed v. Transamerica Corp., 99
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cause the sellers of the target company were prevented from realizing the
profits that Chiarella did. Such conduct fits well within the protective fea-
tures of the special facts doctrine.
The Court also could also have chosen to adopt the quasi-insider theory.
This theory postulates that certain individuals, occupying a preferred posi-
tion in the securities market, may acquire nonpublic information to the dis-
advantage of others.'62 The Second Circuit found that the quasi-insider
category was nearly analogous to the market insider category that it had
suggested as a premise upon which rule 10b-5 liability could be based, 1- and
F. Supp. 808, 829 (D. Del.), reaff'd on later motions, 100 F. Supp. 461 (D. Del. 1951),
modified on other grounds, 235 F.2d 369 (3d Cir. 1956) (duty to disclose may be premised on
special circumstances); Lingsch v. Savage, 213 Cal. App. 2d 729, 735, 29 Cal. Rptr. 201, 204
(1963) (duty to disclose imposed where one party in possession of facts not known to the other);
Jones v. Arnold, 359 Mo. 161, 169, 221 S.W.2d 187, 194 (1949) (duty to disclose arises where
facts are not within fair reach of other party). See 3 L. Loss, SECURITIES REGULATIONS 1445 (2d
ed. 1961). Professor Loss observed that rule 10b-5 applies whenever any person, insider oi
outsider, engages in "fraudulent practices" in securities transactions. See also Fleischer, Secur-
ities Trading and Corporate Information Practices: The Implications of the Texas Gulf Sulphur
Proceeding, 51 VA. L. REV. 1271 (1965). Fleischer suggested that the duty to disclose arises "in
those situations which are essentially extraordinary in nature and which are reasonably certain
to have a substantial effect on the market price of the security if disclosed." Id. at 1289.
In his dissent in Chiarella, Justice Blackman noted: "[A]ccess to 'special facts' has been a
recurrent theme in administrative and judicial application of rule 10b-5 to insider trading. Both
the SEC and the courts have stressed the insider's misuse of secret knowledge as the gravaman
of illegal conduct. The Court, I think, unduly minimizes this aspect of prior decisions." 445
U.S. at 249 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
162. The quasi-insider theory was first articulated in the American Law Institute's Federal
Securities Code, which partially codifies rule 10b-5 (in § 1602) and prohibits insider trading (in
§ 1603). ALl FED. SECURITIES CODE § 1602, 1603 (1980) [hereinafter cited as ALI CODE].
Under the Institute's definition, quasi-insiders would include judges' clerks who trade on in-
formation in unpublished opinions, bank employees trading on undisclosed knowledge of in-
terest rate changes and printers who trade on undisclosed knowledge of imminent tender offers
(citing United States v. Chiarella, 588 F.2d 1358 (2d Cir. 1978), cert. granted, 441 U.S. 942
(1979)). ALI CODE, supra, § 1603, Comment (d). Further, the comment indicates that if con-
duct sufficiently "egregious, shocking, or offensive" cannot be rationalized on an insider analy-
sis, a plaintiff may rely upon the broad provisions of § 1602(a)(1) which state in pertinent part:
"(a) It is unlawful for any person to engage in a fraudulent act or to make a misrepresentation in
connection with (1) a sale or purchase of a security .... Id. The Second Circuit found Chiarel-
la's conduct to be sufficiently egregious "to fit the most restrictive definition of a quasi-insider"
and that he should be barred from trading under § 1602. 588 F.2d at 1366. Chief Justice
Burger, in his dissent, argued that the quasi-insider theory supported his position that when an
informational advantage is gained by deceptive practices made possible through one's position in
the market, the conduct is violative of § 10(b) and rule 10b-5. 445 U.S. at 240 (Burger, C.J.,
dissenting). The majority, however, conspicuously ignored the quasi-insider theory. Utilizing a
better reasoned analysis, the Court would have deemed Chiarella an insider under § 1603(b)(3)
of the ALl CODE, which provides that an insider is one "whose relationship or former rela-
tionship to the issuer gives or gave him access to a fact of special significance . . . not generally
available ... " ALI CODE, supra, § 1603(b)(3). Such a finding would have effectively connected
the Institute's quasi-insider theory with the special facts doctrine because Chiarella's rela-
tionship with the offeror companies, through his employment with Pandick, afforded him access
to facts of special significance.
163. 588 F.2d at 1365.
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completed its well-reasoned decision by coupling the quasi-insider theory
with a test that found that those with "regular access to market information"
should come under the proscriptions of rule 10b-5.11 The Court, however,
established that the regular access test espoused by the Second Circuit was
insufficient to support a duty to disclose nonpublic information." The duty,
according to the majority, arose out of the "relationship between the par-
ties," rather than the source of the information." The narrow view taken
by the majority regarding the quasi-insider theory indicates its neglect of the
broad purposes and remedial nature of the antifraud laws.
A third theory upon which Chiarella's liability could have been premised
was the misappropriation theory announced by Chief Justice Burger.'67 He
argued that an absolute duty to disclose information arises when a person
misappropriates nonpublic information. The Chief Justice adopted that
theory to recognize that the general rule allowing nondisclosure of informa-
tion in an arm's length transaction" must give way when an informational
advantage is obtained by illegal means.6 9 The misappropriation theory is a
particularly attractive vehicle when the policies underlying the antifraud
securities laws are considered. 70 Enforcement of section 10(b) and rule 10b-
5, grounded on a broad interpretation of "misappropriation," buttresses the
purpose and policies of the antifraud laws because it attacks the very con-
duct Congress sought to proscribe-those manipulative and deceptive de-
vices that undermine investor confidence in the securities market. Further,
the misappropriation theory would clarify the scope of the section and rule
when read in conjunction with Affiliated Ute Citizens v. United States. 7' In
that case, the Court emphasized that section 10(b) and rule 10b-5 "by re-
peated use of the word 'any' are obviously meant to be inclusive."'7 Con-
struing the theory to apply to "any" person would identify the class of poten-
tial violators, thereby providing adequate notice to traders in the securities
markets and satisfying the doubts of the majority who feared the creation of
a general rule of disclosure. Applying such a reading in Chiarella would
have allowed the majority to affirm his conviction based upon precedent and
policy.
164. Id. at 1365-66.
165. 445 U.S. at 231 n.14.
166. Id.
167. Id. at 240 (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
168. As long as one party does not actively mislead another he may be free to take advantage
of facts that his business acumen can bring him. W. PROSSER, LAw OF ToRTS § 106 (4th ed.
1971).
169. 445 U.S. at 240. The Chief Justice recognized Professor Keeton's comment: "Any time
information is acquired by an illegal act it would seem that there should be a duty to disclose
that information." Id. (quoting Keeton, Fraud-Concealment and Non-Disclosure, 15 TEx. L.
REV. 1, 25-26 (1936)).
170. See notes 103-106 and accompanying text supra.
171. 406 U.S. 128 (1971).
172. Id. at 151.
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CONCLUSION
Chiarella is the Supreme Court's latest decision in a series of holdings
that have the effect of thwarting the protective policies underlying the anti-
fraud securities laws. The majority has given notice to the securities market
that section 10(b) and rule 10b-5 liability are grounded upon a duty that
originates from a relationship of trust and confidence. The Court's ruling
ignores the effects of Chiarella's conduct by utilizing a narrow interpretation
of the section and rule, a construction contrary to the principles manifested
by its legislative and judicial history. The restrictive holding fosters ma-
nipulative and deceptive practices that harm the integrity of the securities
marketplace. As a result of the holding, it is difficult to predict the fate of
those investors for whom protection was intended. Perhaps the recently
adopted SEC tender offer rules will at last create the shield that must hold
firm if equitable trading in securities is to be fostered.
Marc Bennett Stookal
